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HPOLLO EXPER I ENCE REPORT 
GU I DANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEMS: 
COMMAND AND SERVICE MODULE ENTRY MONITOR SUBSYSTEM 
B y  B e n  F!eina, Jr.,  and  Herber t  G. Pat te rson 
Lyndon B.  J o h n s o n  Space Center  
SUMMARY 
The design and development of the command and service module entry monitor 
subsystem resulted in a conceptual component that appeared to be capable of performing 
functionally and of meeting mission requirements. However, the conversion of the 
component f rom design to hardware ihat would perform as designed was a frustrating 
task. From the beginning of the entry monitor subsystem qualification test program, 
hardware problems appeared that continued throughout all manned Apollo flights. 
Although some of these problems were due to poor workmanship, most were caused by 
various component pa r t s  not performing as designed. Even though modifications to the 
hardware were made throughout the Apollo Program, component par t  deficiencies were 
never eliminated completely. 
INTRODUCTION 
The entry monitor subsystem (EMS) was incorporated into the Apollo command 
module (CM) to provide a backup means of monitoring guidance and navigation (G&N) 
controlled change in velocity (delta-V) and of providing thrust  termination to  the stabili- 
zation and control system (SCS) controlled delta-V, as well as to provide a visual means 
whereby G&N entry t ra jector ies  could be monitored and compared with predicted t r a -  
jectory curves.  This  report  includes a discussion of EMS development problems, as 
well as EMS problems encountered during the first five manned Apollo flights, and a 
review of the major modifications performed to resolve those problems. 
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND DESIGN CONCEPT 
Des ign  Concept 
The command and service module (CSM) EMS design concept evolved from the 
single requirement for  providing a redundant, manual capability to evaluate and control 
the entry trajectory (ref.  1) by means of visual entry-corridor-verification displays. 
The evaluation aspects  were primarily concerned with monitoring the path of entry 
according to a se t  of prescribed entry curves to  determine whether the ensuing 
trajectory would produce conditions jeopardizing the safety of the crewmen. The con- 
t ro l  aspects provided the knowledge required to assume manual control at any time and 
to complete a safe entry. The concept was further expanded to achieve maximum 
trajectory design flexibility in the primary guidance, ' navigation, and control sys-  
tem (PGNCS) (normally automatic) and to  achieve mechanization and use simplicity in 
EMS design. 
The design concept f ac to r s  necessitated the definition of all system limits that 
could affect crew safety in t e r m s  of entry performance constraints. The systems 
having crit ical  interfaces with the entry trajectory a r e  primarily the thermal protection 
system (heat shield), the operating time-limited systems, and the flight crew. The 
l imits were defined by entry range (time) and acceleration constraints. These con- 
straints,  the vehicle aerodynamic configuration, and the EMS response -time character - 
is t ics  dictated the trajectory-shaping limit patterns on the flight-monitor scroll .  To 
share  sensors  and electronics, the EMS display w a s  mechanized to perform powered- 
flight functions in addition to the required entry functions. 
System description and components. - The EMS (fig. 1) provides information to 
the flight crew for  monitoring the PGNCS-controlled entry performance and the PGNCS- 
controlled delta-V, for  providing thrust termination signals through the SCS-controlled 
delta-V, and for manually controlling entry after a PGNCS failure. The EMS also 
displays to the flight crew very high frequency (vhf) ranginginformation between the CM 
and the lunar module. The system consists of both hardware and software. The soft- 
ware aspects of the EMS refer to the flight-pattern limit-line generation and to develop- 
mental techniques and procedures. The EMS hardware includes the components and 
electronics required to drive the major displays. The hardware consists of the scrol l  
(entry acceleration load factor G and inertial  velocity V plotter), a roll  attitude 
indicator (MI), and a delta-V/range-to-go digital display counter. 
Physically, the EMS (fig. 2) consists of two basic assemblies:  the entry monitor 
control assembly (EMCA) and the entry monitor sc ro l l  assembly (EMSA). The EMCA 
contains the electronic components and is composed of integrated circuits;  circuit boards;  
down l ight 
RJEC . reaction jet engine on-off control GDC = gyroscope display coupler 
AV velocity change SPS - service propulsion system 
Figure 1. - Entry monitor subsystem 
block diagram. 
a range integrator; an accelerometer;  a 
delta-V/range -to-go counter logic; a pulse 
sca le r ;  power supplies, relays, and switches; 
and all associated wiring. The EMSA o r  G-V 
plotter assemblv consists of a scrol l  of My- 
lar tape o r  film imprinted with rays called 
G-onset, G-offset, and range-potential lines. 
The stepper motors,  servomotors,  gear  
t ra ins ,  and electronic components necessary 
to drive the scro l l  are enclosed within the 
EMSA. 
The EMS display is composed of five 
functional components essential  to entry 
trajectory monitoring and flight control. 
The five components are the MI, the entry 
threshold indicator (0. 05G), the corr idor  
verification indicator, the delta--V/range -to - 
$40 Counter, and the flight moiiitor O r  Scroll. 
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Figure 2. - Entry monitor subsystem. 
The M I  is an instrument used to  display the angular position of the lift vector 
about the relative wind vector of the vehicle. The indicator displays continuous rota-  
tion in e i ther  direction. 
The entry threshold indicator is a lamp that is illuminated when the vehicle 
encounters a threshold aerodynamic acceleration level, normally 0.05G. This  dis-  
play provides a visual indication that the xtmosphere of the Earth has  been encountered 
and indicates the initiation of entry.  The threshold lamp is extinguished at any t ime 
during entry when the acceleration load factor falls below the prescribed level of 0.02G. 
The corr idor  verification indicator consists of two lamps, one of which is illumi- 
nated at a prescribed t ime (normally 10 seconds) after the entry threshold is reached. 
The lamp illuminated depends on the measured acceleration level. The two lamps a r e  
identified with the required lift orientation during the initial atmospheric penetration 
and are used to  verify and, i f  necessary,  correct  the orientation. 
The delta-V/range-to-go counter is a digital display that indicates the predicted 
velocity of the spacecraft .  The counter is located directly below the flight monitor. 
The flight.monitor o r  scrol l  is the major component of the system. The scrol l  
provides a recti l inear presentation of G as a function of V. The display is created 
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with a Mylar tape that has  a monitoring pattern printed on the front  of 90-millimeter 
film and a dye-encapsulated emulsion bonded on the back. The tape is contained in 
the scrol l  assembly and is driven at  a speed horizontally proportional to velocity 
change. The vertical  axis is driven to a position proportional to the acceleration load 
factor. The scribe removes the emulsion and c rea t e s  the entry trajectory G-V trace 
as the tape translates horizontally and the scribe moves vertically. The trajectory 
trace is compared by the pilot to the permanently displayed monitoring pattern that 
defines the limiting G-onset and G-offset r a t e s  throughout entry. 
Hardware requirements. - In implementing the hardware requirements for EMS 
velocity and range-to-go functions, which are the two most important calculations 
performed, a computing technique called the digital-operational method was used. 
This method combines some of the characterist ics of both digital and analog methods. 
The overall computational concepts are those of analog operational systems, in which 
information flows continuously from one circuit to another as received. Each circuit  
entity performs a mathematical operation (such as multiplication, integration, and 
addition) on the input data. The digital characterist ics of the EMS result  from the fact  
that the system variables (i.e., velocity and distance) are represented in discrete o r  
pulse form. The discrete nature of these variables allows the use of a hardware mech- 
anization with integrated circuitry and thus reduces size,  weight, and power 
consumption. 
Software Concept 
Description and concept. - The EMS provides a recti l inear display of the total 
aerodynamic-acceleation load factor as a function of the inertial  velocity magnitude 
during the entry flight phase. The display mechanization provides a t race of actual 
G and V and families of predetermined G-V profiles that a r e  used by the pilot to 
assess the character of the entry trajectory on the basis of the c r i te r ia  used to develop 
the predetermined G-V profiles. The G-V profiles are not t ra jector ies  nor a r e  the 
profiles intended to represent trajectories,  even though it may be possible in some 
instances to maneuver the vehicle so that the actual G-V conditions correspond to those 
of a given profile. The profiles actually represent  the limiting rate  at  which the value 
of G may be increasing o r  decreasing at  a particular velocity and the G condition 
for which the pilot. may maneuver the vehicle and avoid violating the c r i te r ia  used to 
develop the slope of the profile. A family of profiles is used to present the limiting 
slopes because the profiles can be conveniently and meaningfully interpreted by the 
pilot. Therefore, the required information can be presented with two easily obtained 
variables, G and V, without resorting to the generation of acceleration rates .  
Flight -pattern limit -line generation and developmental cr i ter ia .  - The procedures 
a r e  outlined for the three types of flight l imits incorporated into the EMS software. 
flight l imits and the associated procedures for  their development may be generated to 
any criterion that can be defined as a function of velocity and acceleration variables.  
The procedures presented herein pertain only to  c r i t e r i a  that have been specifically 
defined for  the Apollo lunar missions. The EMS scro l l  patterns for  Apollo lunar- 
return entries a r e  shown in figures 3(a) and 3(b). 
The 
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(a) Lunar 3500-nautical-mile range limit pattern. 
r R a n g e  guidelines G-onset lines- 
LNonexit Orbital velocity i n d i c a t o r 1  Velocity, Wsec x 13 
l imi t  l ines 
(b) Lunar nonexit range limit pattern. 
Figure 3. - Entry monitor subsystem scrol l  patterns for  lunar-return entries.  
G-onset limits: The criterion for the G-onset flight l imits is to not exceed a 
specified maximum G-level. Specifically, the dG/dV limits must be determined as a 
function of G and V at the most adverse vehicle lift attitude (full negative lift, where 
lift @ = 180") so that, when this condition is reached, the pilot can delay for 2 seconds 
and then initiate a maneuver to the best vehicle lift attitude (ful l  positive lift, @ = 0"). 
The ensuing trajectory then wi l l  result in a peak G of 10. It is not necessary to com- 
plete the maneuver to the best  lift attitude when the pullout at  10G is achieved. 
10G does not represent  a rigid limit (i.e.,  deviations of 10 to 15 percent above 10G 
are tolerable), the analysis model considers only off -nominal (not acceptable) devia- 
tions in the most sensitive parameters.  The parameters  are the vehicle lift-to-drag 
ratio, initial attitude, and maneuver response. All other parameters  a r e  designated 
as acceptable and a r e  a zero-inclination conic (latitude = 0", azimuth = 90") and the 
1962 U.S. Standard Atmosphere. In general, the procedure used to a r r ive  at  the 
limiting flight conditions is to work backward from the known terminal c r i te r ia  (in this 
ca se ,  10G) to determine the acceptable initial conditions that a r e  the flight limits. 
Because 
Nonexit G-offset limits: The criterion f o r  the nonexit G-offset l imits is to main- 
tain trajectory conditions that do not result in exiting from the atmosphere, as defined 
by a selected minimum G-level (G = 0.20), o r  do not exceed a specified maximum 
range. 
G-onset l imits in that the limiting dG/dV ratio as a function of G and V must be 
The requirements f o r  meeting this cri terion are s imilar  to those needed for  the 
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determined. 
($ = O"), and the maneuver i smade  to  the best lift attitude (+ = 180"; full negative lift) 
incorporating the same pilot-response and vehicle -response requirements.  
f o r  the nonexit G-offset limit, the criteria are more cr i t ical ,  and the analysis model 
must be constructed so that a worst-case model resu l t s .  
In this case,  the most adverse vehicle lift attitude is ful l  positive lift 
However, 
The procedure fo r  obtaining the flight l imits  f o r  the G-offset l imits  is to  work 
backward from the defined terminal conditions to determine acceptable initial conditions. 
The specified minimum G-level is used to define a terminal condition in the same man- 
ner  as the maximum G-limit was used to  define an initial condition. However, the 
c r i t e r i a  include a range limit, and this  limit does not provide a defined terminal con- 
dition. 
limit c r i te r ia  and with other flight safety criteria is generated. 
To include the range criteria, a limiting G-V profile that is compatible with the 
Maximum range G-offset limits: The cr i ter ion f o r  the maximum range G-offset 
l imits  is to maintain trajectory conditions that do not exceed a specified maximum 
entry range. Unlike the nonexit limits, this  cri terion will allow an atmospheric exit 
following initial entry. The flight l imits  must be determined as a function of G and 
V such that ranges up to the specified maximum can be obtained consistently and such 
that no ranges in excess  of this value can be achieved. This s e t  of flight l imits  incor- 
porates the limiting G-V profile as defined by s teps  1 to  4 of the nonexit pattern and, 
in fact, may be the same profile as long as the range limit, the analysis model, and 
the flight mode are the same as those of the nonexit pattern. 
l imits  generated from the limiting profile are determined in exactly the same manner 
as those generated from the nonexit limits. Th i s  generation includes flight l imits  that 
occur at G-levels less than those of the limiting profile. 
In addition, all flight 
The only difference between the methods used t o  obtain the Gof f se t  l imits  and 
those used to obtain the nonexit l imits  occurs  in defining the acceptable terminal  con- 
ditions at G = 0.20 for  velocities less than the velocity a t  which the limiting profile 
becomes tangent to G = 0.20. F o r  the nonexit l imits ,  G = 0.20 was  the lowest allow- 
able load; consequently, the terminal conditions could be obtained directly. F o r  the 
maximum range G-offset limits, the range must be constrained to  a maximum magni- 
tude; consequently, the allowable conditions at G = 0.20 must be compatible with 
th i s  range. 
To determine the allowable conditions, the manner in which the trajectory is to  
be shaped throughout the entry flight must be specified. The exact trajectory shaping, 
o r  flight mode selected, is part  of the design model. The flight mode selected is based 
on a constant G-level during the supercircular flight region to  a velocity a t  which full 
positive lift (G = 0.20) is implemented and maintained to  exit. Following exit, a zero-  
lift attitude ($ = 90") is maintained to  an altitude of 25 000 feet .  
The trajectory data to define acceptable terminal  conditions are separated into 
four groups as follows. 
1. The limiting trajectory profile 
2. The maximum trajectory 
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3. Fu l l  positive lift, constant-G trajectories 
4. Limiting profile, constant-G trajectories 
The maximum trajectory defines (1) the minimum exit velocity from which the range 
limit can be achieved and (2) the corresponding maximum G-level that can be encoun- 
tered and the range limit that can sti l l  be achieved. The maximum trajectory se t s  the 
lower velocity limit for  which terminal conditions must be defined. The lower velocity 
and the velocity at which the limiting trajectory becomes tangent to G = 0.20 set the 
two extremes in exit conditions. 
Verification and simulation of the flight limit lines and range guidelines. - Proce- 
du ra l  and simulation examinations designed to verify and evaluate the adequacy of the 
EMS flight limit lines and the range guidelines have been performed. The purpose of 
the procedural examination was to verify the procedures and data  that related to the 
derivation of the EMS flight limit lines and range guidelines for  the two types of lunar 
scrol l  patterns (3500-nautical-mile range limit pattern and nonexit range limit pattern). 
All derivation procedures conformed to all other existing procedures. Data were 
checked to ensure consistency throughout the development of each set  of lines. One 
e r r o r  was  found in the development of the 75-nautical-mile range guideline. The e r r o r  
caused this guideline to represent a range that was incorrect by 2 to 4 nautical miles 
for  G-levels between 2.5 and 3 . 0  and between 7.0 and 8.0. However, in an actual 
entry,  the e r r o r  developed a t  the 75-nautical-mile range guideline would be eliminated 
as the G-V trace approached the 50-nautical-mile range guideline; thus, the e r r o r  
actually would not represent a ser ious compromise with the EMS backup ranging 
capability. No other e r r o r s  o r  inconsistencies were found. The flight limit lines and 
the range guidelines, with the one exception noted, were correctly developed and were 
valid for all applicable flight conditions for Apollo entr ies .  
Two independent manned simulations were performed to verify and evaluate the 
flight limit lines and the range guidelines on the two lunar scrol l  patterns.  The purpose 
of the f i r s t  simulation was  to evaluate the G-level and the range attained on the scrol l  
patterns of the design models after a violation of the scrol l  pattern had occurred. 
pr imary intent was to evaluate the human aspects, as opposed to exact numerical 
resu l t s  that could be handled digitally. 
The 
The resul ts  of the first simulation indicated that the G-onset and G-offset lines 
on both scro l l  patterns are valid for  all cases in which the pilot delay time in recog- 
nizing a violation is less than the design value of 2 seconds. Simulation results also 
indicated that the EMS monitoring task of judging the slopes of two lines (one of which 
is dynamic) within 2 seconds of the actual tangency is a feasible pilot task but requires  
close attention and a cr i t ical  pilot attitude. 
The second simulation was performed to evaluate the range guidelines and var i -  
ous backup ranging techniques that could be used in the event of a PGNCS malfunction. 
Results of the study indicated that use of the EMS range guidelines provides the best 
method for  backup ranging. 
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The results of the EMS flight limit line and range guideline verification and 
simulation studies are summarized as follows. 
1. The EMS G-onset limit lines, the EMS 3500-nautical-mile range limit lines, 
and the EMS skip limit lines were correctly developed. Therefore, the scrol l  patterns 
investigated can be used to monitor PGNCS performance during all Apollo entr ies .  
2. The EMS range guidelines, with one exception, were correctly developed. 
The one exception can be accounted for  during manual ranging so that, in the event of 
a PGNCS malfunction during entry, the range guidelines can be used in backup ranging. 
3 .  The EMS criterion for  manual takeover is based on the pilot's evaluation of 
a tangency condition between the G-V trace and the flight limit lines. 
DEVELOPMENT AND QUAL1 F I  CAT1 O i l  
Prototype Hardware Development 
Complete system development and compatibility testing was  accomplished on a 
prototype EMS breadboard assembled on two chassis  with an independently mounted 
scrol l  assembly. 
closed-loop system performance in t e r m s  of magnitude of unwanted signals and in 
t e r m s  of EMS susceptibility to externally generated signals and to internally radiated 
signals i n  the immediate environment for  a wide range of operating conditions. The 
principal benefits of the testing were confirmation of filter design optimization and 
demonstration of acceptable electrical  noise and transient suppression. 
The testing enabled evaluation of component compatibility and 
Qual i f i ca t ion  History 
Qualification tes t  program. - Much difficulty occurred with the EMS during the 
f i r s t  attempt at  qualification testing. The original qualification tes t  was aborted 
because of repeated failures encountered during the vibration and temperature tes ts .  
The test  unit was modified and the tes t s  repeated. The modifications were directed 
at what were considered the pr imary causes  of failures: intermittences in the elec- 
tronic components package and scrol l  assembly electroluminescent short  c i rcui ts  
to ground. 
After the minor modification period, the qualification t e s t s  were attempted; 
however, EMS fai lures  continued. The failures recorded during the performance of the 
test  fe l l  mainly into four categories. 
1. Problems with the scrol l  assembly 
2. Susceptibility to humidity 
3 .  Intermittent connections on the terminal boards because of vibration 
4. Repeated problems with the electroluminescent lighting panels 
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The most severe problems were associated with the scrol l  assembly and the RAI elec- 
troluminescent lighting. Much redesign w a s  required for solution of these problems. 
Fo r  example, elimination of the electroluminescent lights on the scrol l  assembly and 
on the RAI required the addition of incandescent lamps. 
Delta-qualification design and proof tes t  program. - One production EMS (qualifi- 
cation tes t  unit 2) was  subjected to the full ser ies  of qualification tes t s  to certify the 
flightworthiness of EMS design improvement changes that had been incorporated after 
the original EMS qualification tes ts .  Only two of the changes were significant: 
(1) the use of incandescent lighting for the scroll  and f o r  the RAI and (2) the improved 
(more flexible) initialization of the range-to-go integrator. Numerous failures were 
encountered during the delta-qualification design and proof tes ts ;  however, the only 
environment that adversely affected the EMS w a s  the salt-fog and combined oxygen- 
humidity portions of t e s t s  with corrosive contaminants, oxygen, and humidity (CCOH). 
Problems of minor significance, such as  electrical  overstressing of some EMS 
components during the insulation resistance tes ts  performed after the environment 
tes ts ,  were resolved by modifying tes t  equipment and procedures. 
failure to  scribe and a V-axis  failure during thermal vacuum testing were corrected 
by verifying the co r rec t  stylus spring force and by checking the film spool interference 
between the rol l  of film and the housing. 
Such conditions as 
Several problem areas were encountered that were the direct  result  of CCOH. 
The qualification tes t s  revealed moisture problems around the hermetically sealed 
delta-V/range-to-go indicator (causing dimming and flickering of the electroluminescent 
segments) and around the potting material  enclosing the wire header to the hermetically 
sealed function switch. These situations were corrected by a design change in which 
the delta-V/range-to-go display assembly was epoxy-bonded to the front panel and by 
improvements in manufacturing process controls and in inspection to ensure compati- 
bility with humidity. No other significant problems were discovered in tes t s  on the 
remainder of the EMS components. 
Flammability tests. - Flammability tests were performed on a mockup unit con- 
taining EMS components made of material  generically s imilar  to that used in the actual 
spacecraft  configuration. The purpose of the t e s t s  was to determine the s t ructural  
flammability character is t ics  of the EMS in 6 .2-  and 16.5-psia oxygen environments. 
The tests were to determine whether, in the event of an internal f i re ,  the EMS com- 
ponent units would rupture and thus permit the scattering of flaming contents and would 
emit f l ames  through vents and thereby propagate the flames to nearby nonmetallic 
mater ia ls .  
The flammability tes t s  demonstrated that the EMS would not propagate f lames as 
a resul t  of an internal fire. However, minor material  changes were required to meet 
new Apollo flight material  selection cri teria.  A potting compound on one of the EMS 
cables was covered with an aluminum shield. A silicone heat-shrink sleeve was 
removed from a cable. Polyamide 
spot-ties were replaced with Beta cloth spot-ties. The function selector switch knob 
made of tenite was replaced with a knob made of aluminum. 
The nylon sleeving on a dust cover was removed. 
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Centrifuge tes ts .  - Throughout the original qualification tes t  program and early 
production phases, one design deficiency was  found that required major redesign: 
The scrol l  assembly and the RAI electroluminescent lights did not provide sufficient 
illumination to observe the scroll .  In addition, the electroluminescent tabs around 
the scrol l  and the RAI were susceptible to moisture, and this susceptibility caused 
nu me rou s e le c t r  olumine scent failure s . 
To implement a new design for the scrol l  and RAI lighting, a centrifuge tes t  was 
The EMS used 
performed at the NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) (formerly the Manned 
Spacecraft Center (MSC)) to establish the exact lighting requirements. 
was a modified engineering prototype with incandescent lights for  scrol l  and RAI illumi- 
nation. The scrol l  patterns used with the EMS were approved for Apollo mission 
orbital and lunar profiles. The subjects included three engineers from MSC, two 
astronauts, and three test pilots employed by the contractor. 
observed the EMS scrol l  and functions throughout the G-profile. 
Each tes t  subject 
The test resul ts  were determined from the comments of the subjects during and 
after the test runs and from the subjects' abilities to detect trajectory violations during 
the runs.  The maximum G-level reached in these tes t s  w a s  9.5G. 
In all ca ses ,  the subjects found that immediately after shifting their  eyes  f rom 
the entry t race to another part of the instrument panel, it  w a s  difficult to visually r e -  
acquire the t race.  Each subject recommended use of a colored t race.  The corr idor  
verification indicator w a s  sufficiently bright that no problem existed under any of the 
acceleration conditions. The 0.05G light was found to be too bright when viewed with- 
out the filter. A l l  subjects recommended that a fi l ter  be used. The subjects recom- 
mended that the numbers on the range-potential lines be placed in a vertical  column 
instead of in a staggered arrangement on the scrol l  pattern. The G-scale on the left 
side of the display was also found to be too wide; it was obstructing too much of the 
usefu l  trace.  
The principal benefits of the centrifuge testing were the confirmation of a day- 
glow orange background to improve identification of the t race,  a narrower G-scale, 
an optical filter design for the 0.05G and service propulsion system (SPS) thrust  lights, 
and the vertical placement of the range-potential guideline numbers.  In general, the 
changes made as a result of the centrifuge tes t  program provided an improved flight- 
worthy scroll  assembly. 
Delta-vibration qualification tes ts .  - The EMS was  subjected to  a total of 10 min- 
2 Utes of random vibration at  0.067 g /Hz with no anomalies occurring during o r  after 
the delta-vibration test .  System performance during prefunctional and postfunctional 
testing w a s  normal except f o r  an identical failure occurring in both functional tes ts .  
The stylus tip penetrated the Mylar film to the extent that the G- and V-ax i s  dr iver  
became inoperative. Analysis indicated that the stylus penetration resulted from 
excessive retracing of the scribe line, with other factors  contributing to the penetra- 
tion. 
anomaly was not considered to be environmentally induced. 
delta-vibration tes t  provided additional confidence that the acceptance vibration tes t  
level of 0.04 g /Hz does not degrade the flight hardware.  
Because there were no indications of penetration during the vibration cycle, the 
The completion of the 
2 
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Design and proof tes t s  for  vhf ranging. - Design and proof tes t s  were  also per-  
formed to certify the flightworthiness of the EMS unit modified to incorporate vhf 
ranging within the EMCA, and of the improved header seal within the EMSA. The 
modified elements successfully completed all tests.  
in a r e a s  not associated with the modifications. However, no problem was  attributed 
to the environments imposed. 
Some failures were encountered 
A hardware failure was  detected before the random vibration; the G-axis servo- 
motor (stylus drive) hesitated approximakely 30 to 60 seconds before responding and 
driving from the 9G level to 0.22G. Subsequent analysis of the failure established 
that it was  caused by a fractured solder joint that had apparently been damaged during 
the modification of the EMS qualification test unit. 
During the combined high-temperature and vacuum environment, the EMSA 
scrol l  drive failed. Disassembly of the EMSA revealed that the internal front plate 
had not been relief-milled (as specified) to provide space for the orange tape that 
was  added to produce a "colored" G-V trace.  The clearance between the internal front 
plate and the enclosure was insufficient, and the buildup of scribe-coat residue caused 
frictional forces  beyond the capabilities of the V-axis  stepper motor. 
Several failures caused by ar. e r r o r  in the qualification test procedure and by 
noise pickup of a wire within test-equipment cabling were encountered. Test pro- 
cedure changes were implemented to prevent the problem from recurring. After the 
noise-sensitive wire w a s  rerouted within the test-equipment cable, proper operation 
of the EMS was verified. No failures were encountered either in the new header seal 
o r  in any of the circuits that were added or modified by incorporation of the vhf-  
ranging mode. 
Microencapsulated-dye-coated scroll  engineering development tes ts .  - Engineer- 
ing development tes t s  were performed to evaluate a microencapsulated-dye-coated 
EMS scroll .  One of the most significant failures encountered with the previous scrol l  
assembly occurred during the Apollo 9 and Apollo 10 flights. 
penetrate the emulsion backing of the scroll  pattern and thus failed to produce a visi- 
ble t race.  
The G-stylus failed to 
Several failures were encountered with the originally used scribe coat through- 
out the qualification tes t  phases. 
coat formula, to the scribe-coat application technique, to defective stylus springs, 
and to improper stylus tips. For  each failure, some form of corrective action was 
implemented such as using sharper tips, increasing the spring force, improving the 
formula with the elimination of urea from the sc r ibe  coat, and using different purg- 
ing procedures. Although these minor corrections seemed to indicate a tentative 
solution to the scribe-coat problems, the contractor w a s  directed to investigate the 
scr ibe coat thoroughly. Areas  investigated included, but were not necessarily limited 
to, the following. 
Some of the failures were attributed to the scribe- 
1. Basic process  changes of the scribe coat 
2.  Length of bake and number of bake cycles 
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3.  Exposure time to air during handling and installation 
4.  Effect and control of ambient humidity in the handling a r e a s  
5. Measure o r  indication of scribe-coat hardness 
6. Time limits on exposure to vacuum, heat, and humidity 
The scribe-coat investigation was terminated prematurely by the contractor because 
he thought that no greater  improvement could be achieved with the existing scribe 
coat. 
Concurrently with the scribe-coat investigation, a search for  an alternate 
scribing concept w a s  begun. A survey of the industry was performed, and a state- 
ment of work w a s  awarded to develop a more functional and reliable type of recording 
assembly. The study w a s  designed to integrate and evaluate available technology that 
w a s  related to the scrol l  recorder  tape requirements and that could be introduced into 
the existing flight scrol l  assembly with minimum hardware modifications. The 
studies were performed sequentially : dye selection and evaluation, encapsulation of 
selected dyes, formulation of emulsion coatings, development of coating techniques, 
and environmental testing of coated Mylar tapes. 
In the beginning of the EMS scrol l  program, contractor conferences provided 
information and dye materials that enabled proceeding to the encapsulation study 
immediately. Encapsulation studies were performed on each of six dyes. Because 
some of the dyes were used in contractor-furnished paper and had been extensively 
investigated, encapsulation presented no problems. 
The capsule coatings are self-contained capsule systems;  that is, the encap- 
sulated dye is f i r s t  applied to the Mylar substrate and then overcoated with a phenolic 
res in  dispersion. On pressure activation of the dry coating, the encapsulated dye is 
released and immediately r eac t s  with the acidic phenolic r e s in  to develop a colored 
print. 
A production EMS scrol l  assembly was powered by bench test  equipment that 
permitted evaluation under laboratory conditions, lighted and unlighted, of various 
scrol l  t races  using a coated scroll .  The existing scribing method w a s  compared to 
the contractor method. The contractor method did provide a usable t race under the 
conditions demonstrated; however, the t race w a s  pale red and did not contrast wel l .  
A darke r  color of dye was used to improve the contrast. The new trace w a s  also 
slightly narrower: 0.020 to 0.025 inch compared to 0.030 inch. A slightly wider 
scribe was developed as a resul t  of this test .  
On June 5, 1969, two contractor pilots and two astronauts participated in a 
centrifuge evaluation of a scro l l  incorporating the previously discussed changes. Each 
pilot made two runs in the centrifuge, the f i r s t  at  5 .8G and the second a t  9.4G; the 
latter was  a maximum G-profile. 
the tracebackground contrast, and a reshaped stylus tip that was used produced a 
The dark-red dye used in the new scro l l  improved 
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slightly wider trace.  Based on the successful tes ts ,  it was  concluded that the 
contractor-developed method provided a visible and readable t race under normal-G 
and high-G entry conditions. 
Af te r  the centrifuge tes ts ,  engineering development t e s t s  were performed by the 
contractor during June and Ju ly  of 1969. Both the EMSA and individual segments of 
the microencapsulated-dye-coated scro l l s  were subjected to environments that might 
adversely affect them, and the EMSA and scroll  segments performed successfully in 
all the environments to which they were exposed. A few anomalies occurred during 
the testing; however, the anomalies e i ther  could not be attributed to the environments 
imposed o r  were encountered only in off-limit conditions. The successful completion 
of the design verification test  program demonstrated that the coated scrol ls  were 
compatible with the selected Apollo environments. No failures o r  anomalies were 
encountered that would prevent the coated scrol ls  from producing an acceptable entry 
t race.  
FLIGHT HI  STORY 
In each of the first five manned Apollo flights, several  malfunctions of the EMS 
occurred. Many of the anomalies recorded were hardware failures,  whereas others 
were classified as operational procedures or  equipment-operation peculiarities. The 
significant fact about these failures is that none of them occurred during the qualifi- 
cation tests. A combination of marginal design conditions and poor workmanship 
accounted for  the majority of the failures.  
A crit ical  design review of the EMS w a s  conducted after the malfunctions had 
been encountered. Several major design improvements were implemented to improve 
EMS operation and to increase EMS reliability. In addition to making hardware 
improvements, ex t r a  c a r e  during the modification cycle w a s  requested of quality 
control and manufacturing personnel. Despite the extra  precaution taken to ensure 
trouble-free hardware, additional minor problems were  encountered with the redeli- 
vered units. Table I is a summary of the overall  problems encountered during the 
Apollo 7 to 11 missions. 
i 
L 
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TABLE I. - ENTRY MONITOR SUBSYSTEM MISSION PROBLEMS 
I 
Mission 
Apollo 7 (CSM 101) 
~~~ 
Problem 
An improper scribe drive unit (EMCA) was replaced. 
The replacement unit had ground and flight problems. 
1. Range -to -go function 
2. Delta -V/range -to -go counter jumps of the 
"90 000" digit 
The delta-V/range-to-go counter jumped 100.4 ft/sec 
at Saturn IVB separation. 
The midcourse correction (MCC) 5 velocity w a s  not 
measured properly by the EMS. 
The delta-V/range -to -go counter jumped during 
post-MCC -5 troubleshooting. 
Scroll scribe perturbations occurred during entry. 
No G-V trace scribing w a s  obtained during entry. 
Intermittent scribing was obtained during preentry 
tests. 
Electroluminescent segment failure occurred in the 
delta -V/range -to -go numeric display counter. 
Apollo 9 (CSM 104) 
Apollo 10 (CSM 106) 
Apollo 11 (CSM 107) 
Apollo 7 Mission 
Performance. - Both the delta-V and the range-to-go counter c i rcui ts  in the 
EMS malfunctioned before lift-off of the Apollo 7 CSM. The f i r s t  failure involved 
the range counter during a self-test. In this tes t ,  the counter is preset,  then counts 
down in response to a known stimulus for  a specified time, and finally reaches a 
value near 0 miles. The system repeatedly failed the self-test ,  both before flight 
and in flight. 
A delta-V/range-to-go counter malfunction, totally independent of the range 
counter failure, was noted during the prelaunch setup of the delta-V/range-to-go 
counter just  before lift-off. A "9" appeared in the most significant digit of the counter 
when a crewman switched the function selector to the "delta-V set" position; how- 
ever ,  the operation w a s  normal during a repeat  of the procedure. The malfunction 
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occurred several  t imes during flight and, in all but one instance, coincided with a 
switching operation. 
Postflight testing and analysis indicated that the most probable cause of the 
"90 000" digit-jump anomaly was a high-resistance c r imp  joint on wire 18 of the 
delta-V/range-to-go display. The high resistance caused a voltage drop of approxi- 
mately 0.7 volt direct  current  (dc) in the 4-volt dc input line. The voltage-drop level 
is near the operational threshold of the circuit. 
During postflight testing, the range integrator malfunction w a s  verified and 
repeated. However, during temperature testing in the investigation of the "90 000" 
digit-jump anomaly, the range integrator began functioning properly, and the malfunc- 
tion could not be induced again. 
The most probable cause of the range integrator anomaly was the short  c i r cu i tkg  
of welded leads in the range integrator submodule. The short  circuiting caused the 
velocity regis ter  to be latched at 37 000 ft/sec and, thereby, induced a 2.2-nautical- 
mile e r r o r  in the entry monitor self-test and a g r o s s  e r r o r  in ranging during entry. 
Postmission modification. - The postmission corrective action implemented re- 
quired soldering of all wire cr imp joints in the delta-V/range-to-go counter and per-  
forming of low-voltage margin tests of the counter-integrated circuit module. A 
thermal cycling screening tes t  w a s  also instituted as part  of acceptance testing. 
Entry postflight results.  - Postflight assessment disclosed that the anomalies 
encountered prevented accomplishment of some of the detailed flight tes t  objectives. 
The ranging accuracy could not be assessed because the range-to-go display did not 
operate correctly as had been anticipated. The G-V was displayed by the entry moni- 
to r  properly. The EMS G-V flight scrol l  t race correlated well with the PGNCS t r ace  
flown during the entry trajectory. The velocity e r r o r  of 286 ft/sec at 11 500 ft/sec 
after 0.05G was within both the hardware and the total delta-V e r r o r  budget of 
300 ft/sec. The total velocity e r r o r  of 52 ft/sec at  4000 ft/sec was  again less  than the 
97-ft/sec budgeted delta-V e r r o r .  Despite the range integrator anomalies, the EMS 
demonstrated proper scrol l  operation and delta-V control during powered flight and 
entry. 
Apollo 8 Mission 
Performance. - The following performance anomalies in CSM 103 were observed 
by the Apollo 8 liight crew during the mission. 
1. A -100.4-ft/sec jump occurred in the delta-V/range-to-go counter display a t  
the time of CSM separation from the Saturn N B .  (Postflight crew debriefing confirmed 
that the jump actually was -100.4 ft/sec. ) 
2. A -6.2-ft/sec e r r o r  occurred in the delta-V measured during midcourse 
correction (MCC) 5. The actual MCC-5 delta-V w a s  -5.0 ft/sec, and the EMCA e r r o r  
should have been 0.7 ft/sec maximum, as stated in the specification requirements. 
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3. A higher than normal EMCA acceleration drift ra te  occurred immediately 
following completion of MCC-5. A counter display change f rom -6.2 to  -6.9 ft/sec was  
observed by the flight crew immediately following MCC-5, just before the EMS was  
turned off. 
4. Erroneous fast counts as high as  -20 ft/sec occurred when the EMS mode 
switch was cycled f rom "standby" to "auto. I' The counts occurred during post-MCC-5 
troubleshooting performed by the flight crew. The magnitude of the count increased 
when attempts were made to go through the switch-closure points slowly during 
actuation. 
1 
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5. Two negative acceleration pulses occurred on the EMSA scrol l  pattern dur-  
ing entry. 
Postflight testing. - After flight, the EMSA passed a visual inspection and a com- 
plete functional test ,  and no anomalies were noted. During functional testing of the 
EMS, including the EMCA, er ra t ic  accelerometer operation was noted. 
ometer null output was  unstable for a period after the EMCA acceleration input axis 
was placed on the horizontal. 
The acceler- 
Transient signals on the accelerometer analog dc output were also observed. 
The transients occurred only during the t ime following a repositioning of the acceler-  
ometer input axis between zero-g and approximately one-g conditions. Occurrence of 
the transients depended on allowing sufficient stabilization time before repositioning the 
accelerometer input axis. 
The linear acceleration ineasurement unit (LAMU) was physically removed f r o m  
the EMCA, and the same transient behavior was  produced by physically moving only 
the LAMU. During these tes ts ,  the LAMU output signals were disconnected from the 
EMCA electronic components and monitored to ensure that the anomalies were the 
resul t  of an  LAMU malfunction rather  than a problem within the EMCA electronic com- 
ponents. This EMCA disconnection isolated the problem to the LAMU, and the LAMU 
was subsequently returned to the vendor for further analysis and tes t .  During vendor 
testing, the LAMU continued to exhibit extraneous outputs, which were thought to be 
caused by an air bubble in the accelerometer sensor.  Before the LAMU was  opened, 
the validity of the hermetic seal  was  verified by leak tes t .  When the unit was opened, 
oil w a s  found around the sensor/electronic unit dust cover. The leak path was traced 
to the O-ring seals  under the two oil fill/seal screws on the sensor  cover. The sensor  
w a s  drained of oil, refilled, resealed with new O-rings and seals ,  and retested.  The 
mass  of oil removed indicated that approximately 1 cubic centimeter of oil had leaked 
f rom the unit. Retest verified proper accelerometer operation and confirmed the 
hypothesis that the air bubble caused the extraneous acceleration outputs. 
1 
Postflight ground testing correlated the spurious accelerometer output to the 
delta-V/range-to-go counter in the delta-V mode and to the G-V t r ace  in the entry 
mode. The spikes on the G-V t r ace  were not of the same  magnitude as the spikes 
encountered during the mission; however, ground testing indicated that the air bubble 
had varying magnitudes of effect, primarily as  a function of the history of rotational 
motion and acceleration inputs. 
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Extensive diagnostic testing was performed in an effort to duplicate and isolate 
the spurious -100.4-ft/sec velocity that appeared in the delta-V/range-to-go display 
during Saturn IVB separation, as well as the spurious counting that occurred during 
slow cycling of the mode switch. With a positive acceleration, the delta-V/range -to- 
go display counts down if an acceleration reversal  (negative acceleration) occurs  as 
the display reaches 0 .0  ft/sec and if the display jumps to -99.2 ft/sec. This phenom- 
enon was repeated by using both the sine torque and the tilt  table for  acceleration 
reversals .  This  tes t  was also run on prototype unit 1, and display jumps to -9.2 ft/sec 
as wel l  as to -99. 2 ft /sec were  encountered. The display jump was caused by a logic 
race that is inherent to  the design of the delta-V/range-to-go display. 
The postflight testing and analysis resulted in the identification of two specific 
problems within the Apollo 8 EMS. The first, air bubbles in the accelerometer,  is 
considered an isolated case; the second, the logic race,  is inherent to the EMS design 
but may o r  may not exist in all units, depending on component character is t ics  of 
individual units. The manner in which these problems were reflected in the EMS per-  
formance during the mission is specified as follows for  each flight anomaly. 
1. A -100.4-ft/sec jump in the delta-V/range-to-go counter display occurred 
at the t ime of CSM separation from the Saturn IVB. 
duplicated; however, the logic race,  which w a s  at least the major contributor to the 
e r r o r ,  w a s  repeated many t imes during testing. During these tes ts ,  the display 
consistently jumped to -99.2 ft/sec; however, the t e s t s  were performed with the 
Apollo 7 (CSM 101) accelerometer ra ther  than with the Apollo 8 (CSM 103) acceler-  
ometer.  In addition, circuit analysis indicated that the logic r ace  would just as 
likely cause a display jump to -100.2 ft/sec ( the difference of 0.2 ft/sec being likely 
to have mission segments). This  jump, coupled with the normal accelerations during 
Saturn IVB separation, could create  the -100.4-ft/sec display. An alternative and 
equally probable cause of this anomaly would be the combination of the two system 
problems. Whereas the logic race caused the display to jump from 0.0 to -99.2 ft/sec, 
the difference of 1 . 2  ft/sec was the result  of both natural accelerations associated 
with the separation and spurious counts caused by the air bubbles. 
This anomaly w a s  never exactly 
2. A -6.2-ft/sec e r r o r  occurred in the delta-V measured during MCC-5. 
This  anomaly can be directly attributed to the accelerometer air bubble. 
3. A higher than normal EMS acceleration drift rate occurred immediately 
following MCC-5. 
4. Erroneous fast counts as high as -20 ft/sec were  observed when the mode 
switch was  cycled from "standby" to "auto. 
troubleshooting performed by the flight crew. 
The counts occurred during post-MCC-5 
5. 
during entry. 
Two negative acceleration (+G) pulses on the EMS G-V trace occurred 
I tems 3, 4, and 5 can be directly attributed to the accelerometer air bubble. 
The spurious counting was  caused by the residual effect of MCC-5 on the accelerome- 
t e r .  The air bubbles were distorted as a function of acceleration and accelerometer 
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internal geometry; following acceleration, return of the bubble to its minimized p res -  
s u r e  shape damped fluid motion and resulted in spurious accelerometer outputs. The 
accelerometer air bubble is considered to be the total cause; slow cycling of the mode 
switch simply inhibited the display in the standby mode and allowed the display of 
spurious counts when in "auto. " 
I 
I The foregoing conclusions were based on extensive testing and analytical effort 
after the Apollo 8 mission. The problems that were found resulted in positive co r rec -  
tive action to preclude a recurrence on subsequent missions. 
Postmission modification. - After flight, the following corrective action was  
implemented for  the Apollo 9 (CSM 106) mission and subsequent missions. 
1. An accelerometer stabilization tes t  was added to the EMCA acceptance tes t  
program to verify the absence of air bubbles in the accelerometer damping fluid. 
2. A verification test  was added to prove the integrity of the plug-type O-ring 
seals. 
I 
3 .  The EMCA acceptance vibration tes t s  were revised to include three-axis 
tes ts .  
4. For the Apollo 9 (CSM 104) mission and subsequent missions, an Apollo 
Operations Handbook (AOH) change, dated February 4, 1969, was implemented to 
correct  the erroneous display of 100 ft/sec. The AOH change moves the setting of the 
display from 0.0 to -100.0 ft/sec, moves the mode switch to "standby, ' I  and specifies 
when it is necessary to bias the counter. 
---- Entry postflight results.  - Even though the EMS encountered intermittent t ran-  
sients contributing approximately 100 ft/sec to  the velocity e r r o r  during the Apollo 8 
flight, the EMS operation a t  the end of the entry t r ace  w a s  within the e r r o r  budget 
specified in the CSM Operational Data Book (Pa r t  I, Constraints and Performance).  
Postflight assessment indicated that the general  operation of the EMS during entry w a s  
satisfactory, except for the two intermittent transients caused by the air bubbles. The 
transients affected both G and V channels. In addition, an entry pattern misaline- 
ment amounted to a constant 0.44G e r r o r  throughout the entry t race ,  which, in itself, 
did not degrade the usefulness of the EMS. This type of discrepancy in the initial 
setting of the scrol l  should have been corrected before the entry phase. 
By comparison to the G-time and V-time derived f r o m  onboard pulse-integrating 
pendulous accelerometer data, overall  scrol l  operation (G-V t race)  was within the 
0.12G limit, except at the two points at which transient positive-G pulses occurred. 
The EMS ranging performance was satisfactory. The EMS ranging accuracy f o r  a 
lunar-return entry is k23.04 nautical miles.  The  EMS range-to-go a t  the end of the 
entry t r ace  (V = 4000 ft/sec) was  17.4 nautical miles.  The range-to-go counter counts 
approximately 25 nautical miles f rom the end of the entry t r ace  to the drogue deploy- 
ment altitude. At drogue deployment, the range w a s  -7.6 nautical miles,  which is 
much more accurate than the *23.04-nautical-mile lunar-return ranging accuracy 
specified. A further substantiation of the accuracy of the EMS was reported when the 
crew verified that the range-to-go display read 50 nautical miles  just as the 
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50-nautical-mile potential-range guideline was reached on the scroll. Comparison of 
the delta-V at 11 500 ft/sec after 0.05G (V = 24 700 ft/sec) to  the hardware delta-V 
budget of 100 ft/sec indicated that the Apollo 8 EMS delta-V of 130 ft/sec with the two 
transients w a s  not within the hardware e r r o r  budget but was  within the total delta-V 
budget of 300 ft/sec. 
Apollo 9 Mission 
Performance. - On the Apollo 9 (CSM 104) mission, the entry monitor failed to 
scribe during entry. Postflight testing of the scrol l  assembly revealed a leak around 
the base of one of the four scribe-glass-adjustment-screw cups. The neon leak rate 
w a s  approximately 1.0 cm /sec. The leaking screw cup showed evidence of physical 
damage, an indication of possible unit mishandling after the last  leak test. 
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Analysis of the scrol l  after it was removed from the scrol l  assembly disclosed 
that the scrol l  scribed properly for  the f i rs t  flight test pattern. The scrol l  failed to 
scribe at  the s ta r t  of the preentry flight test pattern and began scribing again during 
the l a s t  half of the pattern. Scribing of the film w a s  proper down to the initial set 
position of the first entry pattern, but scribing failed from that point to entry until 
jus t  before drogue deployment. 
Photographs of the scrol l  made through the use of special lighting and photo- 
graphic techniques revealed that the acceleration and velocity drive assembly that 
holds the stylus for  scribing the film functioned properly and would have indicated the 
proper entry pattern had scribing occurred. Hardening of the scribe coat during 
flight prevented scribing by the stylus. 
The scrol l  is susceptible to moisture, and subsequent slow drying of the moisture 
causes a hardening of the film coat. 
ambient air leaked into the unit before lift-off. During flight, reduction of cabin p re s -  
su re  to 5 psia provided a slow vacuum dry  as the moist air was expelled from the 
unit. After being soaked for  10 days at 5 psia, the scribe coat hardened and prevented 
scribing. Postflight analysis also revealed contamination to the stylus holder and 
bushing; the contamination caused a 2- to  3-second lag in the stylus response. 
The scroll  w a s  probably moisturized when 
Postmission modification. - After flight, the following corrective action was 
implemented for  the Apollo 10 (CSM 106) mission and subsequent missions. 
1. The stylus spring load was  increased to 11 cunces. 
2. The dimensions of the stylus holder and bushing were verified. 
3. Acceptance t e s t s  were performed to verify repeated scribing. 
Entry postflight resul ts .  - Postflight assessment  disclosed that, because of the 
scribing anomaly encountered during entry, the scrol l  reproduction was  not sufficient 
for  an accurate reading of the G-V t race.  However, the scr ibe did t rack the load 
factor and velocity of the trajectory accurately during entry. The G-V impression 
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left on the actual entry pattern was photographed using special filters and lighting in an 
attempt to obtain a faint t r ace  and to reconstruct G-time and V-time histories.  
Postflight entry trajectory simulations were generated using the latest state- 
vector information to determine whether the EMS scribe impression followed the actual 
trajectory load factor and velocity. 
data reduced from the scrol l  photographs, the scribe was  shown to be driven according 
to the trajectory flown. No entry e r r o r  budget checks were made on this flight because 
the t r ace  impression was not of sufficient quality to provide good engineering G-V data. 
The delta-V performance was  satisfactory during the eight SPS burns and was well 
within the accuracy of 1 . 3  percent of the burn delta-V specified in the Apollo CSM 
Operational Data Book. 
By coinparison of the G-V data to the qualitative 
Apol lo 10 Mission 
Performance. - Following successful completion of the preentry self-tests on the 
EMS for  the Apollo 10 (CSM 106) missioc, the stylus of the entry monitor failed to 
scribe while the scrol l  was driven to the entry pattern. The scrol l  was slewed back 
and forth once, and the stylus then penetrated the emulsion on the scroll .  The t r ace  
of acceleration as a function of velocity was normal throughout entry. 
The emulsion used on the scrol l  film had a latex rubber and detergent base. 
The formulation of the detergent, which w a s  commercially procured, had been changed 
by the addition of uric acid. 
by a chemical reaction with the gelatinous film on the Mylar scroll .  
Uric acid tends to increase the hardness of the emulsion 
Postmission modification. - After flight, no major change was made to the emul- 
sion formula f o r  either the Apollo 11 o r  the Apollo 1 2  scroll. Instead, a decision was 
made that use of the original formulated detergent for  t i e  sc ro l l  emulsion base would 
be continued with better application and formulation controls o r  tnat a new technique 
incorporating a flight-qualified pressure-sensitive scrol l  coating would be used for  the 
scrol l  on subsequent vehicles. 
Entry postflight ___- results.  - Postflight assessment  revealed that the overall opera- 
tion of the EMS w a s  demonstrated on the Apollo 10 mission, despite the small  scribing 
anomaly that was  encountered in the self-tests before entry.  The EMS parameters  
were within the budget l imits f o r  both the range-to-go and the delta-V functions. 
Apollo ll Mission 
Performance. - An electroluminescent segment on the EMS delta-V/range-to-go 
numeric display w a s  reported inoperative by the flight crew during the Apollo 11 
(CSM 107) mission. Because the EMCA that houses the numeric display w a s  not re- 
moved f rom the spacecraft for  failure analysis, a circuit  analysis w a s  performed to 
identify the most probable cause. The possible problem areas were  investigated and 
isolated to the electroluminescent segments, the blanking circuits,  and the segmellt 
d r ive r s  and interconnecting wiring. 
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The electrical  circuit  analysis was performed basically to determine whether 
the problem was generic and applicable to all the numeric displays. Each digit in the 
numeric display contains seven individual electroluminescent segments; each segment 
is controlled by separate but identical logic. Any of the individual components such 
as resis tors ,  silicon-controlled rectifiers,  and integrated circui ts  could have caused 
the failure. 
Each electroluminescent segment making up the digits is independently switched 
through a logic network that activates a silicon-controlled rect i f ier  to bypass the light 
when it is not illuminated. The power source is 115 volts at 800 hertz.  
A reliability review revealed four cases  of malfunctions s imilar  to that reported. 
One malfunction involved a constantly illuminated segment. In each case, the cause 
was  identified as misrouting of logic wi re s  in the circuitry controlling the silicon- 
controlled rectifiers.  The misrouting bent the wi re s  a c r o s s  terminal s t r ips  contain- 
ing sha rp  wire ends that punctured the insulation and caused either short  circuits to  
ground o r  a &volt activation o r  deactivation, respectively, of the segment. 
The affected circuitry was  reworked in the process  of soldering cr imp joints that 
were involved in the Apollo 7 anomaly. An inspection to detect misrouting was per-  
formed; however, because of restricted access,  the inspection was  limited. 
Although several  other failure mechanisms existed in circuit  elements and leads, 
there  was  no associated failure history. A generic o r  design problem was considered 
unlikely because of the number of satisfactory activations demonstrated by units in the 
field. 
During qualification testing, several  display segments failed because of CCOH 
penetration of the moisture seal. However, in  no case w a s  a single segment blanked 
while the remaining segments were in full brilliance. An improved moisture seal was  
installed to resolve the moisture problems. 
Postmission modification. - No major postmission design change w a s  required, 
because the past history of the numeric display problems encountered during qualifi- 
cation testing revealed that the most probable cause for  the electroluminescent segment 
failure was  either a faulty component controlling that particular segment o r  a workman- 
ship problem associated with wiring o r  soldering. The recommendation for  this  par-  
t icular failure was  to rely on existing acceptance screen tes t s  and an additional 
spacecraft  tes t  for  verifying illumination and uniform intensity of all segments. 
Entry postflight results. - Postflight assessment  indicated satisfactory overall 
operation of the EMS. All the test objectives were accomplished. Because the on- 
board da t a  storage equipment was not turned on during entry, the accuracy of the EMS 
load factor,  velocity, and range data by comparison with the integrated pulse- 
integrating pendulous accelerometer data w a s  not verified. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The operational characterist ics of the entry monitor subsystem were greatly 
improved with two design modifications: the changing of the crimp-joint terminal 
connections of the delta-velocity/range-to-go counter to solder connections and the 
replacing of the original scribe coat with a new microencapsulated-dye process.  The 
lesson learned from experience with the entry monitor subsystem was  to be wary of a 
design that is relatively straightforward in itself but that is very difficult to 
implement. 
I 
* !  
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Houston, Texas, September 4, 1974 
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